Nous avons psychologisé comme les fous, qui augmentent leur folie en s'efforçant de la comprendre.
4 twice over, once as cause (doer, substratum) and once as effect (thing done), all in the service of the slavish fiction of free will. 6 The self thus emerges as fictive to a special degree: it shares the unreality of all platonisticmetaphysical conceptions, but has an additional fictivity due to its role in masking the real underlying manifold and in the moralisation of humanity's self-conception.
Kantian criticism of Nietzsche's theoretical conception of the self
Though the details of this picture are very much Nietzsche's, and bound up with his more general antimetaphysical theses, in its general outline Nietzsche's theoretical view of the self is not unfamiliar,
and it is open to some but not all of the criticisms standardly levelled against so-called Humean or Reductionist theories of the self.
One initial point of importance in clarifying Nietzsche's position: There is a weak sense of illusion in which one may describe an ontological commitment as illusory in so far as it naively fails to grasp that the reality of the item in question is not sui generis but actually consists in the reality of something else, to which it may be reduced. This is not what Nietzsche means. Although, on occasion, Nietzsche says things that might be taken to suggest a reductionism, whereby the I has reference on each occasion of its use to the dominant member of a psychological composite, his claim
is not that what we understand by the I, the semantic content of I-thoughts, can be given in terms of statements about power relations between psychological states. This cannot be his view, because he himself affirms explicitly that the representation I has a primitive, transcendental status (in relation to theoretical knowledge claims) which is incompatible with reductionism: he describes our 'belief in the I as substance' as the assumption 'on which the movement of reason' depends − our attribution of reality to all other things, he says, requires the 'soul-superstition'; this superstition is, he says, the 5 foundation of the oldest realism (N3: 7[63] , 140 / KGW: VIII-1.325), 'the basis on which we make everything be or understand it to be [nach dem wir Alles sein machen oder verstehen]' (N3: 2[91] , 77 / KGW: VIII-1.104), and abandoning it would mean no longer being able to think, 'nicht-mehr-denkendürfen ' (N3: 7[63] , 140 / KGW: VIII-1.325). And he says, in words that could have come from Leibniz or Kant, that we 'have borrowed the concept of unity from our concept of ''I'' − our oldest article of faith. If we didn't consider ourselves to be unities, we would never have created the concept of ''thing''' (N3: 14[79] , 246 / KGW: VIII-3.50). 7 Since Nietzsche's view is not a reductionism in the classical sense but rather (in terms of our contemporary distinctions) a kind of eliminativism, his position is not vulnerable to the sorts of epistemologically-oriented criticisms made by antiReductionists, when they argue that the I, the essential indexical, plays an irreducible role in our cognitive performances, which become unaccountable if we suppose the 'I' to refer merely to psychological states and their relations.
Nietzsche's account is exposed, however, to another sort of criticism. There are three ways in which eliminativist positions are standardly supported: (i) first, by arguments for incoherence or lack of conceptual and epistemological integrity in the conceptual item targeted for elimination; (ii) second, by arguments for its explanatory redundancy (in relation to some other, incompatible scheme that does the same job more economically); and (iii) third, by arguing that the item can be explained away (by showing that when we see how our belief in the item arises, and what function the belief serves, we will no longer hold it, or at any rate, no longer be able to understand it realistically). Now there are elements of the first and second patterns of argument in Nietzsche, 8 but it is fair to say that the main burden falls squarely on the third − on Nietzsche's suggestions about the motivation for, and the genesis of the error. The problem arises because any genetic explaining-away of the I, no less than a classical reduction, needs to be expressed in terms that do not presuppose the reality of that which is supposed to be explained away. There is, however, little to show, and little reason to think, that this 6 condition is met in Nietzsche's explanation of how the illusion of the I arises from pre-personal interests and forces of thought. What needs to be explained in the case of the I is not some commonor-garden existential belief, but a very strong, highly distinctive and highly complex reflexive unity, a capacity for constituting identity-in-difference which goes well beyond the capacity for identifying the aggregates and functional unities which can be discovered in the natural world. So the question arises, how, except in the perspective of an I, of something that takes itself to have unity of the self's sort, can a conception of unity sufficient to account for the fiction of the I be formed? (As it might be put: How can the 'idea' of the I occur to a unit of will to power or composite thereof − or to anything less than an I? 9 ) Nietzsche sometimes talks of parts of the psychological complex as seeking to make themselves masters of the complex, in the way that an individual may take charge of a social group.
No doubt parts of an aggregate can generate representations of functional integration, which can then constrain the operation of members of the aggregate in a systematic way, but this sort of structure is a long way off from reproducing the self's unity. In terms of the social analogy, it is as if one were to attempt to explain how a social group can constitute itself as an object of 'we' thoughts by referring to the mere fact of its brute physical domination by one individual member. In short, relations of power may explain the generation of many kinds of mutual representation among psychological items, but not the specific and distinctive mode of representation which is the 'I'. Now it should be said that this criticism does not amount to a refutation of Nietzsche's picture of the self. For it can be replied, first, that conceding our epistemic dependence on the irreducible representation 'I' does not commit one to understanding it realistically, and second that the 'I' can be explained-away as a fiction generated by the power-relations of interacting elements in the psychological composite, on the grounds that functional requirements can (for all we know) give rise to representations whose content overshoots the functional motive that is responsible for creating them − concepts may be generated, in response to functional needs, which go beyond what is needed 7 to fulfil those needs. On this basis, a genetic explaining-away of the I fiction can free itself from the obligation to account for the (functionally gratuitous) complexity that the I-representation actually displays.
This reply preserves the coherence of Nietzsche's eliminativism about the self, but it is clear that it also means that the argumentative support Nietzsche is able to offer for it is limited, and so that − at least until the argument is resumed on a broader front − Nietzsche is a long way off from having a refutation of Kantian or other realist positions about the self. (Relevant at this point is Nietzsche's implicit acknowledgement that, in order to equip himself with an explanatory base that would be adequate to his naturalistic, eliminativist purposes, a hitherto unimagined complexity will need to be attributed to the body 10 − in other words, Nietzsche is aware that he does not have to hand a strong argument of the second type described above, an argument from greater explanatory economy.)
1.3. The conflict of Nietzsche's theoretical conception of the self with his practical conception That Nietzsche's theoretical view of the self is not free from problems of a sort that we are familiar with in a contemporary context from assessing hard-naturalistic proposals in cognitive science, evolutionary psychology and suchlike, is a matter which I will leave aside for the moment. The point I want to dwell on now is an internal one, concerning the lack of fit between Nietzsche's theoretical view of the self and the view of the self required for Nietzsche's values. So there is in Nietzsche's account of practical thought an 'I will' -'I will that this be prized, etc.' -playing a transcendental role roughly analogous to that of the Kantian 'I think' of theoretical judgement. Just as the 'I think' as a condition of judgement does not make the I into the topic of judgement, so the Nietzschean 'I will' does not mean that all that is ever valued is oneself, as per practical egoism; to the contrary, an element of self-transcendence − a moment of relating to something other, by means of which a relation to self is constituted − is built into Nietzsche's picture.
It is a difficult and interesting question what exactly the Nietzschean 'I will' in relation to values comprises: it amounts to more than the practical commitment that is implied trivially in any recognition of a norm, and appears to include an aesthetic or quasi-artistic dimension − the Nietzschean subject will relate to his values in something of the way that an artist relates to his works, as something distinct from himself, yet as an object of pride and ownership, for which the subject claims responsibility or with which it identifies.
In any case, however the Nietzschean 'I will' is to be understood exactly, what is ineliminable from Nietzsche's picture of valuation is the role of the I: not as substratum, nor as equipped with freedom of will in the indeterministic sense, yet as occupying the position of ground. Elimination of this I in favour of thinkings ascribed to complexes of will to power or any other units within the psychological composite would produce a profound self-alienation and undermine the normative dimension of valuation, i.e., the possibility of its being thought that the valuation in any sense 'gets things right'.
This allows us to see what is also correct in the first of the two criticisms. While it is true that there is no inconsistency between our thinking of some individual as bearing value on account of their psychological structure, if that individual is to think of himself as bearing value, then the I-conception is indispensable: Nietzschean man must set value on himself, not on some psychological structure.
And since Nietzsche's ultimate philosophical purpose lies in forging individuals who set value on 10 (affirm) themselves, it follows that his account of the bearer of value does involve attributing reality to the I. Stirner by contrast do theorise the self in a way that gives its proper internal image: they attempt to grasp how the self is for itself, to picture it in philosophical theory in the light of its reflexivity.
Nietzsche's theoretical picture of the self by contrast is consistently external, and can be entertained only for as long as the self is viewed from the outside, whence its discrepancy with the (necessarily internal) practical point of view. It is, I think, not hard to see what adjustments to Nietzsche's theoretical discussion of the self are necessary to bring it into line with his practical conception. In the first place, Nietzsche's critique 13 of traditional metaphysical conceptions of the self does not, on the face of it, need to proceed any further than Kant's conclusion in the Paralogisms, namely that there is a boundary to be marked and respected between legitimate transcendental claims for the necessity of the I-representation, and illegitimate, transcendentally realistic claims regarding the constitution-in-itself of a corresponding object of this representation. 17 This, on the face of it, would allow Nietzsche the I that he needs for practical purposes, while also leaving space for his explanation of the I-fiction to do work − the fiction explanation can be redirected, not against the I as such, but against the specific, hypostatised, platonised conception of the I that plays such an important role in Christianity and theologically contaminated philosophy. The merely transcendental, un-hypostatised I would retain a degree of (relative) spontaneity, but this is just the spontaneity that Nietzsche needs for his practical outlook, and it falls short of the absolute spontaneity and transcendental freedom that threatens to bring with it the objectionable (to Nietzsche) Kantian package of noumenalist metaphysics. Nietzsche would retain thereby the self needed for his practical purposes while being rid of the self that he objects to as a lifeinimical notion.
In the light of this option, Nietzsche appears to have overshot the mark, and to have failed to absorb the Kantian lesson that there is a middle way between 'soul-substratum' and Humean impersonalism; so when Nietzsche sees it to be necessary, in order to deny that there is a 'substratum'
with 'being' that constitutes the metaphysically distinct 'doer' of the deed, to affirm that on the contrary 'the doing is everything' (GM: Essay I, §13, 28 / KGW: VI-2.293), he is going from one false position to its equally false opposite and throwing out the baby with the bathwater.
What is needed in the second place for a unified Nietzschean theory of the self, is something more demanding, and which is not found ready-made in Kant. As noted, while Nietzsche needs to affirm the reality of the I, he differs from Fichte and Stirner in denying that the pure I is a sufficient source of practical normativity. What is needed by Nietzsche, therefore, is a conception on which the 14 I is necessarily always, and without prejudice to its reality, i.e., without being merely reducible thereto, the expression of some or other sort of pre-personal configuration: that is, a conception which holds together in a coherent manner both the unitary I of self-consciousness and the psychological manifold. This would allow it to be maintained both that the causality of the I is properly interpreted as involving necessarily the expression of the dominant power-unit in the psychological composite (or whatever functional arrangement Nietzschean theory tells us is involved), and that the thought which the Nietzschean subject must entertain when a power-unit realises itself successfully, wills values, etc., is an I-thought, not the thought that such and such a power-unit or whatever prevails presently.
Such an account would explain not just why the Nietzschean subject is no more able to give up his I than the Freudian analysand can replace first-person thinking with thoughts about an ego and an id, but why it is right for him to think in I-terms. 18 The task that a reconstruction of Nietzsche faces here, is not peculiar to Nietzsche − it appears also in the philosophy of psychoanalysis, as the problem of understanding how the level of commonsense psychology and self-conscious, self-determining subjectivity joins up with that of unconscious motivation. 19 One historical place where one can see this task at least recognised and to some degree embarked upon is in Schelling, in his attempt to embed the Fichtean self (the practical I) in a naturphilosophisch context (the I as object of theoretical reason and product of nature), and to some extent also in the German romantics (Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel, Schleiermacher). would make Nietzsche's own theoretical picture of the self a regulative fiction. Or alternatively it may be suggested that Nietzsche considers that he has to deny the existence of the I in all senses, on the ground that any admission of the I as something over and above the conglomerate of psychological states, is ipso facto affirmation of a full-fledged Christian soul − an outlook of which there are indeed some signs in Nietzsche, 20 but which it is hard to see how he could make remotely plausible. Or again, it may be proposed, in a historical perspective, that the explanation lies in the way that the later nineteenth-century philosophical environment had occluded the post-Kantian transcendental tradition and made its philosophical resources unavailable to Nietzsche, a key role being played in this process by Schopenhauer on the one hand, and the naturalistic revision-cum-misunderstanding of Kant which prevailed in the first phase of neo-Kantianism on the other.
There is probably some truth to each of these suggestions, but I suggest that in any case, at the same time, the puzzle should be regarded of deeper and more general significance, on the ground that it repeats itself throughout Nietzsche's philosophy. Again and again we find what appear to be puzzling mismatches between different components of Nietzsche's outlook − between Nietzsche's apparent radical skepticism, and his apparent naturalism; between his skepticism, and the objectivity claims (in the psychological if not the normative sphere) that he appears to need for his project of a revaluation of values; between his anti-essentialism and apparent repudiation of all metaphysics, and his apparent metaphysics of will power (and perhaps also of eternal recurrence); and so on. So there is a pattern, and even if through patient analysis, reconstruction of his claims, discrimination between stages of Nietzsche's development, and so on, one can adjust the parts so that a maximally coherent picture emerges, it seems that the overall centrifugal character of Nietzsche's philosophy − the way the bits that compose it, though tethered together, seem to want to fly apart in opposite directions − and the consequent fact that the unity of Nietzsche's philosophy is something that we have to labour to establish, in a way that is not the case for any other modern philosopher: this is surely something that 16 calls for explanation (and to say that it is due to the fact that Nietzsche 'is not a 'systematic philosopher' is, of course, simply to restate the explanandum).
This brings me to the second part of the paper, where I want to see if any progress can be made towards locating this missing metaphilosophical key, and making better sense of the discrepancy between Nietzsche's theoretical and practical views of the self, by considering how Nietzsche understands the relation between theoretical and practical philosophy.
The practical/theoretical relation in Nietzsche
There are two prominent candidates for interpreting Nietzsche's general view of the practical/theoretical relation.
The naturalistic model
The first is the naturalistic conception of the practical/theoretical relation, where theoretical reason is regarded as constitutively independent from practical reason, and as committed to philosophical naturalism. Practical thought is regarded on this model as constrained by theoretical reason in so far as its operations must proceed within parameters set by the facts about how things are, which the interests of practical reason play no role in determining. In Section 3 I will say something about the larger topic of Nietzsche and naturalism. The point to be made here is that the naturalistic view leads to a problem concerning the self-understanding of the Nietzschean subject. We need to ask what, on an interpretation such as Leiter's, the Nietzschean subject understands itself to be doing, when it legislates. On Leiter's Humean interpretation, the legislation of the Nietzschean subject proceeds in an axiological limbo, outside any framework of rational norms, while the subject must at the same time understand its legislation as proceeding in accordance with non-normative, natural law. What follows, on the face of it, is that the Nietzschean subject lacks any rational warrant for regarding his valuation as anything more than the expression of a natural force; 22 and this notion − that one could take one's values, not just when viewing oneself sideways on but also in the very act of legislating and endorsing them, to be nothing more than the causal effects of pre-normative psychological forces − encounters a problem of sheer inconceivability for subjects in whom the taste for justification is well established. This picture seems to require for its intelligibility a return to the pre-reflective normative innocence of the 'masters' of Genealogy I,
leaving Nietzsche wide open to the charge of simple flight from the problems of philosophical modernity. 18 This criticism can be developed by returning to the case of the self and attending to an important difference between Hume and Nietzsche. Nietzsche's dual account of the self has a striking analogy with that of Hume, who famously denies in Book I of the Treatise that there is any idea of the self, while proceeding in Books II and III to make essential use of a fairly rich idea of the self in his analysis of the passions and of the mechanism of sympathy that provides the first plank in his moral psychology. Hume preserves philosophical consistency by holding that the idea of the self at work in the passions is a product of imagination, thereby imputing illusion to natural consciousness. Now the Humean-naturalistic interpreter of Nietzsche may accordingly suggest that the same solution is available for Nietzsche: it is philosophically consistent to assert both the non-existence of a self for theoretical reason and the necessity of the assumption of a self for practical purposes.
Whether this account makes Nietzsche's position consistent depends on whether it mitigates the reflexive unintelligibility that, I suggested, afflicts the Nietzschean subject of legislation on the naturalistic construal, i.e. whether it releases the Nietzschean subject from having to simultaneously affirm and deny the reality of his self. Now we can point to a deep reason why carrying over the Humean model to Nietzsche does not and should not be expected to produce the desired result.
Disunity of reason in the natural consciousness of the Humean subject never surfaces for the subject itself − it comes to light only in Hume's study, and Hume's reflections in his study are forgotten as soon as he steps outside; so the Hume who knows that he has no self and that his reason is disunified, never gets to meet the Hume who thinks he has a self and whose reason is disunited. The results of Humean reflection never issue in a problem − no moment of doxastic choice ever presents itself.
What keeps the situation stable for Hume is the fact that the Humean subject is a conceptually shallow creature, the course of whose practical and evaluative life is determined pre-reflectively by the causality of affect, of a kind which carries a very light theoretical load. And this is exactly not the situation of the enlightened Nietzschean subject, who does not receive values passively from nature 19 but is bound to innovate them, and who is consequently exposed to the full battery of reflective questions which, in the Humean subject, the operation of the passions obviates the need and leaves no scope for. The wall separating life from the study has come down for the Nietzschean subject, who is too far from nature to be protected by nature against experiencing the disunity of his reason.
It is in addition of high importance in this context that Nietzsche's values are not hedonistic but consistently anti-hedonistic. If it were Nietzsche's view that pleasure or desire-satisfaction provides a sufficient ground for value, then arguably there would be no difficulty, or much less difficulty, in seeing how a naturalistic theoretical self-understanding could determine a practical orientation, in so far as the transition from fact to value could be regarded (so the naturalist might argue) as effected, non-deductively yet with a kind of oblique rationality, simply by way of (the subject's assent to) the causal force of inclination, submission to the lure of pleasure. Nietzsche's view, by contrast, is that − while of course evaluation does have for him the kind of live relation to desire which the Kantian excludes − values of the kind that he advocates, ideals, are a great deal more than functions, reflections or derivatives of the hedonic upshot of desire-satisfaction, and cannot be reduced to such.
The overall problem with the naturalistic model, in sum, is that its prioritisation of theoretical reason, and the naturalistic constriction of theoretical reason's scope, leave the practical perspective short of the rationality which it needs in order to fulfil the exacting task which, on Nietzsche's unHumean, non-conservative construal of our axiological predicament, practical reason faces. Arguably there are other, non-Humean, more Aristotelian versions of the naturalistic model that may avoid this implication − richer accounts of Nietzschean nature, that build normativity into it, perhaps centred on the concept of will to power 23 − but they create other problems, by virtue of making Nietzsche's 'naturalism' a very much less familiar kind of thing, and in any case they do not promise to help with the puzzle of Nietzsche's disunified view of the self. 20 
The 'Presocratic' unity-of-reason model
The second model regards Nietzsche's philosophy as aiming to construct a unity of theoretical and practical reason in a sense to which philosophical naturalism is indifferent, and which is defined by commitment to a methodological principle whereby practical considerations have a legitimate role to play at a fundamental level in directing theoretical judgement.
Nietzsche's conception of a unity of the theoretical with the practical is found in his early unpublished writings on the philosophy of the Greeks -in the relatively finished text of 1873, Die
Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen (Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks), and in the collection of notes from 1875 gathered under the title Wissenschaft und Weisheit im Kampfe (The

Struggle between Science and Wisdom).
In Presocratic philosophy begins with Thales' revolt against myth, and eventually, with Empedocles and Democritus, the Greeks found themselves, Nietzsche says, 'well on the way towards assessing correctly the irrationality and suffering of human existence': they had uncovered a new set of possibilities (N2: §191, 131 / KGW: IV-1.177). 25 These possibilities remained unexplored, however, and were later 'covered up' after Socrates aborted the Greek development by dissociating 'life' and 'knowledge', two drives that thereafter increased in power but, because they were no longer 'under a single yoke', struggled increasingly with one another (N2: §200, 143-4 / KGW: IV-1.191-3). 26 Nietzsche says that his own 'general task' is 'to show how life, philosophy, and art have a more profound and congenial relationship to each other', and he adds that he rejects, as did the Greeks, the Nietzsche supposes, is most conducive to the realisation of higher purposes, the flourishing of higher types and so forth. 30 Plausibly, other central elements of Nietzsche's philosophy − eternal recurrence, radical skepticism, the special privilege he accords to art − are better explained by supposing that
Nietzsche is endeavouring to determine what it is rational to think in the light of the overriding necessity of practical existence, than by attributing to him a bedrock commitment to philosophical naturalism. A transcendental view of Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole need not − any more than, I
23 argued earlier, a transcendental account of the self need do so − undermine Nietzsche's antiKantianism; to transcendentalise Nietzsche is not to Kantianise him.
The chief limitation of this interpretative model, it would appear, lies in the difficulty that it encounters in accommodating the strain of aggressive hard naturalism which we also find in Nietzsche, and which is exemplified so clearly by his theoretical treatment of the self: Nietzsche does not attempt to construct a unified theory of the self, so here is one place where he does not do what the unity-of-reason interpretation would lead one to expect him to do. Now various explanations are possible for this fact − I suggested some earlier − and the disunity of Nietzsche's view of the self is not proof that Nietzsche is not in fact striving to forge a unity of reason. What it does seem to mean, however, is that, even if Nietzsche does think that unity of reason is a supreme and necessary philosophical goal, and that practical reason has rights in the theoretical domain, he does not think that a unity of reason can in fact be achieved, or at any rate, he does not himself see a way to achieve it. Another way of putting this is to say that while Nietzsche may be fully prepared to subscribe to the principle of the primacy of practical reason, he does not, it would appear, see a way of applying this principle to yield the results that the principle is intended to achieve. And the underlying reason for this, it would appear, is that Nietzsche regards the claims of naturalism as too strong to allow theoretical reason to be bent into the shape that practical reason needs it to assume.
Naturalism and transcendentalism in Nietzsche
3.1. Naturalism, transcendentalism, and the problem of consistency
The upshot of the previous section is, then, that the naturalistic model, though it coheres with Nietzsche's denial of the reality of the I, conflicts with his practical presupposition of the self, and 24 more generally frustrates the ambitions of Nietzsche's practical thought; while the Presocratic-cumtranscendental unity-of-reason model underwrites the rationality of the Nietzschean practical perspective, and has a strong claim to capture the general sense of Nietzsche's project, but seems obliged to recognise that Nietzsche feels the pull of naturalism in a way that forbids the realisation of a unity of reason in accordance with the interests of practical reason.
There is a strong temptation, particularly when a historical perspective is applied and it is recalled to what a great extent nineteenth-century German philosophy as a whole is dominated by the two vectors of Kantianism and naturalism and driven by the attempt to square the idealist legacy with natural science, 31 to regard Nietzsche's philosophy as a compound of naturalistic and transcendental elements which remain in tension with one another, and which fails to carry through on either the transcendental or the naturalistic side in the way required to achieve philosophical consistency. This would explain why, with respect to the self, Nietzsche appears to be a naturalist with regard to theoretical reason, and a non-naturalist with regard to practical reason.
Views of this kind are found in the literature on Nietzsche. On the pro-transcendental version of his inconsistency, Nietzsche's aversion to the Kantian legacy is responsible for his not having come up with the unified theory of the self (among other things) that his practical project requires. This is, roughly, the estimate of Nietzsche offered by Habermas in Knowledge and Human Interests, where Nietzsche is read as proceeding from a transcendental starting point, but as led astray by naturalistic misconceptions, through an overvaluation of the rationality of natural science. 32 Conversely, from a consistently naturalistic angle there will be a story to tell about what impeded Nietzsche's formulation of a properly naturalistic world-view; for example, Nietzsche may be regarded, I suggested earlier, as having failed to renounce his attachment to non-naturalistic, autonomistic values of sovereign individuality and so forth that a rigorously naturalistic world view is unable to make good sense of, 25 and to reconcile himself to the broadly utilitarian values which are all that a thoroughgoing naturalism can underpin.
However, before the negative assessment of Nietzsche as stumbling on the path to philosophical consistency − that is, to interpret Nietzsche as either (i) an inconsistent transcendentalist, (ii) an inconsistent naturalist, or (iii) simply divided between the two camps 33 − is accepted, we should make sure that no more charitable account of his position is available. It is, after all, not as if the assumptions needed to motivate the reading of Nietzsche as either a transcendentalist or naturalist manqué are ones that Nietzsche may be thought to have no objection to: to put matters in Habermas' way is to presuppose the viability of weakening and containing within transcendental bounds the epistemological authority of natural science, just as the naturalistic view of Nietzsche's shortfallings implies a confidence in the capacity of naturalism ultimately to make adequate sense of our axiological situation. The third interpretation, for its part, imputes to Nietzsche a jarring and improbable lack of metaphilosophical self-consciousness. 34 An alternative, fourth view, which offers more to Nietzsche, is to regard his philosophy, not as unwittingly inconsistent and compromised, but instead as diagnosing the disunity in philosophical reason, identifying it as marking our philosophical horizon, and displaying it for the benefit of our self-understanding. On such a view, Nietzsche is consciously attempting to formulate the non-optimal yet best available combination of theoretical and practical claims within the reach of our reflection,
given the irresolvable contradiction which he sees between the demands of theoretical and practical thought − he thus offers local unities of reason, in place of the global unity of reason which Nietzsche may be regarded as having considered it impossible for enlightened late moderns to achieve.
The Genealogy of Morals, Third Essay 26
Next I want to try to support and develop the idea that Nietzsche has philosophical insight into the naturalism/transcendentalism antinomy. My claim is that he, in at least at one place in his mature writings, makes it an object of philosophical understanding, in a way that, Nietzsche supposes, allows us to recognise the opposition of naturalistic and non-naturalistic self-conceptions as a (presently) untranscendable limit of reflection.
The Genealogy is widely supposed to provide clear support for the naturalistic interpretation of Nietzsche. 35 I want to suggest that, to the contrary, we find Nietzsche at the final point of his enquiry, in the concluding sections of the Third Essay, shifting out of the perspective of naturalism.
In §23 of the Third Essay Nietzsche asks where we can find a will which opposes the ascetic ideal, and notes that it will be said that our modern science supplies this opposing will, a view which Nietzsche rejects as not speaking from 'the abyss of scientific conscience', i.e., not a scientific interpretation of science (GM: §23, 116 / KGW: VI-2.414). This theme is resumed in §25, where
Nietzsche expands on the idea that science does not make itself a value, and so does not supply 'the natural antagonist to the ascetic ideal'. On the contrary, Nietzsche maintains, science 'first needs a value-ideal, a value-creating power' given to it from outside, and this is none other than the ascetic true that man has been degraded, by no means does this signal a release from the transcendental riddle: rather this degradation answers to the same motivation which gave birth to the ascetic ideal.
Since Copernicus, man 'has become animal, literally, unqualifiedly and unreservedly an animal, man who in his earlier faiths was almost God', and his existence has come to look 'arbitrary, idle, and 27 dispensable in the visible order of things', but this experience that man now has of himself − as 'on a downward path', 'rolling faster and faster away from the centre', 'into the piercing sensation of his nothingness' − is simply a further ascetic experience, which has the following deep rationale: 'Suppose that everything man ''knows'' does not satisfy his desires but instead contradicts them [...] what a divine excuse it is to be permitted to lay the guilt for this at the door of ''knowing'' rather than ''wishing''!' Man's self-negation through scientific understanding would amount to a 'triumph for the ascetic ideal' (GM: §25, 122-3 / KGW: VI-2.422-3).
From this interpretation of the ascendant post-Copernican view that man is 'unreservedly an animal' as serving the ascetic ideal, it does not follow, of course, that philosophical naturalism is, on
Nietzsche's view, to be rejected. 36 What it does mean, however, is that naturalism has been reinterpreted at this point by Nietzsche from the standpoint of practical reason, in terms of which it has been evaluated: the perspective of theoretical reason, from which we are able to grasp that our belief in naturalism has itself a naturalistic explanation and justification, has been supplemented by that of practical reason, from which our belief in naturalism appears problematic. However, since it is through naturalism that we have attained the position we are now at, and in any case no alternatives are on the table, the result is only a provisional alienation, a self-distancing, from naturalism, our commitment to which is not cancelled yet has been shown, from the standpoint of value, to aggravate rather than dispel our fundamental problem.
That with the introduction of this new perspective on naturalism in §25 an important rupture has occurred becomes clear if we recall the starting point of the book. In the Preface, Nietzsche makes it plain that the practical-axiological problem of morality has absolute priority in his investigation.
The expectation which the Preface sets up is, accordingly, that naturalism should contribute to the solution of this practical problem. And up until the present point, §25, naturalism appeared to have been doing this, its theoretical explanations having − so we have been assuming − a practical point: 28 Nietzsche allowed us to read him as applying knowledge of nature in the manner of a physician making a diagnosis, in the tacit expectation that the same body of knowledge can be employed to supply the cure. By the end of §25, Nietzsche has indicated that this expectation is disappointed. At any rate, no way of utilising the theoretical self-knowledge that we have gained in the Genealogy to fix our axiological situation is now in view.
In §28, the short concluding section of the Third Essay, the question which was raised first in §13, viz., How does the ascetic ideal preserve life?, is finally given its answer, and it is to be noted that the terms of consideration are here highly simplified. Nietzsche no longer talks about man in terms of historical epochs, or about particular sub-groups or types of man, but about man in general, whom he considers solely in relation to and in terms of the ascetic ideal, such that man appears to be The theme of suffering and its purpose appears earlier in the Genealogy, in §7 of the Second
Essay. There Nietzsche advanced the interpretation of the Greek gods as devices created in order to
give suffering a meaning and life a justification, along with the idea that what most 'arouses indignation' over suffering is its senselessness. But back in the Second Essay there was only a faint suggestion of the new idea that appears in §28. §28 presents the need for meaning as transcending the hedonic problem of suffering, and as affording a total perspective on man − man is 'defined', even more basically than by the ascetic ideal, by his need for Sinn. And this need to find meaning in our suffering, Nietzsche is now claiming, shows that we cannot reconcile ourselves to nature, and is the reason why we do not and cannot take ourselves to be just nature: if we could represent ourselves as being unreservedly animal, then we would not need our suffering to have meaning. §28 is therefore the second non-naturalistic moment in the Third Essay, and it makes the following crucial advance 29 beyond the first: while §25 merely alienates us from naturalism on the limited axiological ground that it intensifies the ascetic ideal, §28 characterises us − or at least, it claims that we characterise ourselves − in a way that goes beyond naturalistic understanding. It is crucial for this that when the need for meaning is introduced in §28, no attempt is made to naturalise it: it is not treated at the physiological level, not historicised or made to seem a product of history, and nothing is said about its origin -rather it is presented as standing outside the foregoing historical story of the Genealogy. We are thereby invited to interpret all that has preceded in the light of it, that is, to see the history of man traced in the Genealogy as a gradual unfolding of this need, a quasi-teleological process explained at the ground level by the need for meaning. Furthermore, we are invited to read Nietzsche's text itself as motivated by it, that is, to regard Nietzsche's own scientific construction of explanations offered in the Genealogy as based on, and deriving its legitimacy from, the need for meaning.
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It is also important that this new perspective on man is at the same time, at the present point in the text, a reflexive perspective. A comparison with Gay Science brings this out. In Gay Science
Nietzsche writes in the language of a natural historian: 'Gradually, man has become a fantastic animal that has to fulfill one more condition of existence than any other animal: man has to believe, to know, from time to time why he exists; his race cannot flourish without a periodic trust in life -without faith in reason in life' (GS: §1, 75 / KGW: V-2.46). The perspective on our need for meaning in Gay Science is external -its existence is recorded as a further fact of human natural history. In §28 of the Third Essay, by contrast, this same fact is viewed and taken up from the inside: the need for meaning is presented not as the peculiar trait of a species, but rather as a practical-axiological problem, which §28, continuously with the Preface and with §25, makes us experience as our own: we confront it practically and not theoretically, directly and not from a distance.
My contention is therefore that Nietzsche concludes the Genealogy with the affirmation that we have a need that points beyond nature and that renders a non-naturalistic self-conception 30 inescapable for us; there is therefore within the Genealogy, on the face of it, a transition of its terms of explanation from the naturalism of the First and Second Essays to the concluding recognition of a trans-natural perspective in the Third. Assuming this reading to be correct, the question that must now be considered is what this implies for the interpretation of Nietzsche's metaphilosophy. In particular:
Is the naturalistic interpretation of Nietzsche unable to do justice to the points in the Third Essay of the Genealogy that I have highlighted?
The naturalistic interpretation is not refuted by the fact that Nietzsche regards scientific understanding as motivated fundamentally by a non-cognitive drive, nor by the fact that it expresses the ascetic ideal, nor again, by its inability to independently create value. 38 The key question is instead what reading it can give of §28 of the Third Essay.
Note that it will not do for the naturalist to observe simply that all that has been shown, strictly, is that Nietzsche accepts the existence in us of a representation, the object of which is, or allows itself to be taken to be, non-natural, viz. Sinn, and not that Nietzsche affirms the reality of the representation's object. While this is true, the challenge is to make naturalistic sense of the nonnaturalistic representation, and this explanandum is not disposed of just by being redescribed as the content of a psychological state. Pursuing this task, Leiter claims that the ascetic ideal's solution to the 'curse of meaninglessness' referred to in §28 is to be understood in terms of the following explanatory elements: first, the claim of the First Essay that suffering produces ressentiment; second, the later claim (Essay III, §15) that relief from ressentiment is achieved by blame, which facilitates discharge, the effect of which is anaesthetic; and third, the role of the ascetic priest in redirecting blame by designating a new culprit, namely oneself. In this way the ascetic ideal allows suffering to be 'overcome'. What it is, then, for suffering to 'be meaningful', on the naturalistic account, consists simply in a pattern of psychological causation described in a reductive, mechanistic and hedonistic psychology: it is straightforwardly equivalent to our having the means to achieve hedonic relief from 31 suffering by means of an anaesthesia-inducing discharge of affect directed at a fictional blameobject. 39 There are two grounds for rejecting this account. First, it inverts the order of explanation implied by §28. Leiter's naturalistic explanation makes the need for meaning an instrumental effect of the hedonic practical problem which suffering presents: we need suffering to 'mean' something, i.e. to be taken to have a blameable cause, because and only because we need to find some or other way to end the pain of suffering. But in §28 Nietzsche presents the need for meaning as the reason, in a nonhedonic sense, why we cannot just live with our suffering, why merely accepting or putting up with suffering, agreeing to suffer, is for us a practical impossibility. Leiter's final explanans is the painfulness of pain; Nietzsche's is the threat of its meaninglessness. These are distinct ways for suffering to be 'unbearable', and Nietzsche's interest is in the non-hedonic, Sinn-orientated conditions which determine whether we can or cannot bear our suffering. 40 Second, the concept of meaningfulness, Sinn, as applied to life or existence, is treated generally by Nietzsche in a way that either does not imply, or that positively precludes, its hedonistic psychological reduction. For instance, when in §7 of the Second Essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche introduces the theme of the meaning of suffering, his initial discussion of its hedonic dimension is quite distinctly overtaken by the non-hedonic language of life's 'justifying itself'. This concern for justification is credited to the Homeric Greeks, who in Nietzsche's terms elude the ascetic ideal, making it impossible to regard this justificatory concern as a product of the ascetic ideal's historical development. Nietzsche's claim in the Second Essay is, furthermore, directly continuous with the Birth of Tragedy's problem of the justification of existence, which is quite clearly not to be understood in terms of hedonistic dynamics, just as tragic affirmation is not presented in that text as a mere hedonistic necessity. Again, in the review of the Genealogy given in Ecce Homo, it is said that the ascetic ideal has been 'the only ideal' until now, when Zarathustra offers an alternative (EH: 114 / 32 KGW: VI-3.351); and since Zarathustra and the ascetic ideal address the very same need, and the appeal of the Zarathustran ideal is entirely non-hedonistic, Nietzsche must think that what makes some or other ideal necessary for us, viz. the need for meaning, cannot be anything hedonic. 41 My account of Nietzsche's position in the Third Essay so far may seem to be have been heading towards a transcendentalist conclusion. But there is another question to be faced: How could
Nietzsche coherently refuse to accept that our need for Sinn has a full naturalistic explanation? How could he think that there is anything more to what we call our 'need for meaning' than there is to the love of God, i.e., a will directed to a fictional object? How could Nietzsche in any way reject the assertion of philosophical naturalism, without a counter-assertion of super-naturalism?
On my understanding, however, this is the very point at which Nietzsche regards philosophical reflection as coming to a halt, and the Third Essay of the Genealogy is intended to show us how and why it must do so. If Nietzsche were to be a consistent naturalist, then he would have to agree that the need for Sinn can be explained as some kind of evolutionary or whatever Nebenwirkung, to be resolved back into a naturalised, mechanistic, hedonistic psychology. But − if naturalisation of the need for Sinn were to have the meaning for Nietzsche that it has for the consistent naturalist − Nietzsche would then have to take Freud's line, that the need for Sinn cannot be taken with philosophical seriousness, and his practical philosophy would crumble. Because Nietzsche instead holds fast to the internal, practical perspective from which the question of Sinn is genuine and ineluctable, he cannot regard the question of whether the need for Sinn is 'naturalisable' as a real question; the possibility that our need for Sinn is 'really' nothing but another natural drive or accidental by-product of such is not a real possibility; the need cannot be de-validated through an exercise of theoretical reason. But nor, on the other hand − even though the need for meaning does have for him the kind of status that is properly called transcendental − can Nietzsche be interpreted ultimately, comprehensively and overarchingly, as a transcendental philosopher: for he does not think 33 that there is anything to be made philosophically of our non-naturalistic self-representation − there is for him nothing that makes that representation 'true', or bestows rationality upon our need for morethan-nature, or that can, in any of the usual philosophical ways, be built upon it by way of a justified theoretical edifice; not even a weaker version of Kant's inference from the incongruity of our representations with nature to our possession of a 'faculty of reason' and corresponding 'rational vocation' can be accepted. 
